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THE CLAIRE DAVIS SCHOOL SAFETY ACT: WHY THREAT
ASSESSMENTS IN SCHOOLS WILL NOT HELP COLORADO
ABSTRACT
The United States is struggling with how to prevent the relatively
new phenomenon of mass shootings or attacks, many of them occurring
in schools. Colorado addressed this by passing the Claire Davis School
Safety Act that allows individuals harmed in acts of school violence to
sue the school districts where the incidents occurred. This law intends to
help protect students and keep them safe in schools. However, the law
not only adds an exception to Colorado's Governmental Immunity stat-
ute but also creates what are commonly known as threat assessments,
which are used to identify potential threats in schools and to mitigate any
problems or incidents before they occur.
While this process seems safe and helpful on its face, threat assess-
ments are difficult to implement and have the potential to cause serious
harm to students. Threat assessments may target certain groups of stu-
dents who are not actually threats but exhibit similar behaviors, such as
students suffering from mental illnesses and students with disabilities. In
addition, threat assessments will ikely have a disproportionate effect on
students of color and will strengthen the already dangerous connection
between schools and the juvenile and criminal justice systems.
Threat assessments in schools send the message that schools cannot
be safe without increased security, increased police force, and increased
fear about school attacks, but that message is incorrect. There are other
ways to keep students safe while also protecting their right to a proper
education and without causing additional harm. For example, an alterna-
tive to the Claire Davis School Safety Act is to create positive school
climates where students feel safe, comfortable, and supported in their
environments, and, therefore, are more likely to reach out for help before
problems become larger issues. Most importantly, another alternative is
to shift the focus from what schools can do to prevent these attacks to
what state and national governments can do to prevent these attacks by
placing the responsibility, not on administrators, teachers, and students,
but on the industry that sells and regulates the weapon often used in
school shootings-guns.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2015, the story of fourteen-year-old Ahmed Mo-
hamed spread quickly across the United States.' Mohamed was hand-
cuffed and arrested at MacArthur High School in Irving, Texas, for
bringing a homemade clock to school, which officials suspected was
actually a bomb.2 By the end of the day, even President Barack Obama
and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton were tweeting about Mohamed
and his homemade clock.3
1. Avi Selk, Ahmed Mohamed Swept up, 'Hoax Bomb' Charges Swept Away as Irving
Teen's Story Floods Social Media, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/northwest-dallas-county/headlines/20150915-
irving-9th-grader-arrested-after-taking-honemade-clock-to-school-so-you-tried-to-make-a-bomb.ece
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Officials at Mohamed's school likely reacted with fear and caution
because of the heightened anxiety surrounding school safety due to
school shootings and other violent incidents that have occurred in
schools across the United States. Since 1999, when two students shot and
killed thirteen people at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado,
the United States has witnessed numerous additional tragic incidents of
mass school violence.4 However, handcuffing and arresting individuals at
any suspicion-like school officials did to Mohamed-is not the answer.
There are more effective ways to prevent school violence and to keep
students safe that do not involve suspecting the worst of students and
subjecting them to constant analysis and scrutiny.
Instead of moving in this direction, Colorado passed the Claire Da-
vis School Safety Act (the School Safety Act), which allows victims of
school violence to sue school districts or charter schools through a lim-
ited waiver of governmental immunity,5 and requires schools to identify
and prevent potential threats to avoid school violence and these legal
claims.6 While this law was passed with the good intention to keep stu-
dents safe, it will be ineffective at preventing school violence, and it will
actually harm many students just as the overzealous policy that allowed
school officials to handcuff and arrest Ahmed Mohamed harmed him.7
While the School Safety Act applies to any act of school violence,
this Comment will focus primarily on research surrounding school shoot-
ings and on the programs and methods used to identify and monitor stu-
dents, more commonly referred to as, threat assessments. Part I of this
Comment will provide an overview of the School Safety Act. Part II of
this Comment will provide background information on Colorado's Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, mass shootings in the United States, the history
and structure of threat assessments, the Second Amendment and gun
culture in the United States, and other countries' approaches to prevent-
ing mass shootings. Part III will analyze why this law will be ineffective,
4. Of the 160 active shooter incidents between 2000 and 2013, thirty-nine occurred at
schools, the location with the second highest rate. J. PETE BLAIR & KATHERINE W. SCHWEIT, TEX.
STATE UNIV. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF ACTIVE
SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013, at 13 (2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/september/fbi-releases-study-on-active-shooter-
incidents/pdfs/a-study-of-active-shooter-incidents-in-the-u.s.-between-2000-and-2013.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3(4) (2016). The Act was signed into law on June 3, 2015.
S. 15-213, 70th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015). It was sponsored by Senators Bill Cadman,
Mark Scheffel, Owen Hill, Larry Crowder, Kevin Grantham, Kent Lambert, Kevin Lundberg, Beth
Martinez Humenik, Tim Neville, and Laura Woods, and Representatives Dickey Lee Hullinghorst,
Crisanta Duran, Daniel Kagan, Jovan Melton, Joseph Salazar, and Jonathan Singer. Id.
6. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-15-101(1)(a).
7. Mohamed says he will not be returning to his old school after this incident. Dominique
Mosbergen, Ahmed Mohamed Will Not Return to MacArthur High School, Family Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2015, 1:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ahmed-
mohamed-changing-schools_55fb8el8e4bOO310edf691da. While this incident occurred in Texas, a
similar event could occur in Colorado with this new legislation. For analysis of negative effects of
the law, see discussion infra Section III.A.-C.
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how this law will actually harm students, and what alternatives provide
better solutions.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE SCHOOL SAFETY ACT
Two separate bills-Senate Bill 15-213 and Senate Bill 15-214-
make up the tenants of the School Safety Act.8 Senate Bill 15-213 creates
a limited waiver of governmental immunity for school districts in cases
of school violence.9 Removing governmental immunity means students
and families harmed from school violence can pursue legal remedies
against the school district.'0 These legal remedies include the ability to
bring a civil suit for damages and to obtain discovery pertaining to the
violent act at the school." Between now and 2017, students and families
can file suits but can only receive discovery as compensation, not mone-
tary damages.12 After July 1, 2017, students and families can file suits
and receive discovery and damages as compensation.'3 Discovery could
include, for example, whether the school had notice that the student who
caused the violent act was dangerous and whether the school failed to
take precautions to prevent violence. Therefore, while Senate Bill 15-213
seems solely about governmental immunity and tort claims, it actually
places an immense responsibility on schools to prevent these legal claims
by stopping any incident that might lead to a claim.14
Preventing incidents is where Senate Bill 15-214 becomes im-
portant. Senate Bill 15-214 created a school safety and youth mental
health committee to address how to prevent acts of school violence. 15
Specifically, the committee has the following responsibilities:
1. "Study issues relating to school safety and the prevention of threats
to the safety of students, teachers, administrators, employees, and
volunteers .. .;"
2. "Study and evaluate programs and methods for identifying and
monitoring students in crisis;"
8. Senate Bill 15-213 and Senate Bill 15-214 were codified in title 24, section 10-106.3 and
title 22, section 15-101(l)(a)(I)-(IV) of the Colorado Revised Statutes respectively. See COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-10-106.3, 22-15-101. While the Claire Davis School Safety Act officially relates to
Senate Bill 15-213 at title 24, section 10-106.3 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, because the two
bills are related, they will be referred to together as the School Safety Act for the remainder of this
Comment.
9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3(4).
10. See id § 24-10-106.3(9).
11. Id.
12. Id. § 24-10-106.3(9)(b)(1). This means families could only obtain information about what
the school knew about the student who committed the act, such as if they failed to take precautions
after identifying a dangerous student.
13. Id. § 24-10-106.3(9). However, the damages are capped at $350,000 per injured individu-
al. See id. § 24-10-106.3(9)(a) (stating that the maximum amount of damages is governed by COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-10-114(1) (2016), which limits damages to $350,000 for injury to one person in a
single occurrence).
14. See id. § 24-10-106.3(3)-(4), (9).
15. Id. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(I}-(IV).
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3. "Develop standardized criteria for school personnel to use in as-
sessing the potential threat posed by one or more students; and . . . ."
4. Make recommendations to the education committees of the general
assembly.16
The purpose of these two bills is to enforce a stricter duty of reason-
able care from schools to their students to prevent school violence and to
keep students safe.17 Senate Bill 15-213 creates the consequence for fail-
ing to do so,'8 and Senate Bill 15-214 creates a method to prevent that
consequence. 19
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will provide background information on Colorado's Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act, mass shooting data in the United States, the
history and structure of threat assessments, the Second Amendment and
gun culture in the United States, and other countries' approaches to pre-
venting mass shootings. This information will provide a foundation for
analyzing the ineffectiveness of the School Safety Act at preventing
school violence, as well as provide a foundation for discussing alterna-
tives to the School Safety Act.
A. Colorado's Governmental Immunity Act
Prior to the School Safety Act, students harmed in an incident of
school violence could not sue their school district because of the Colora-
do Governmental Immunity Act,20 which the Colorado Governmental
Assembly originally adopted in 1971.21 The Act created immunity for all
tort actions against a public entity with six exceptions.22 The six excep-
tions are as follows: (1) automobile accidents; (2) negligent operation of
hospitals and jails; (3) dangerous conditions of public buildings; (4) neg-
ligent construction, operation, or maintenance of public roads; (5) dan-
gerous conditions in public parks and recreational facilities; and (6) wa-
23ter, sewer, trash, and other proprietary activities. Historically, courts
have interpreted "dangerous conditions of public buildings" to apply
only to injuries from dangerous physical conditions in buildings, not to
24dangerous activities in buildings. Therefore, previously under the Colo-
rado Governmental Immunity Act, someone could not sue a school dis-
16. Id.
17. Id. § 24-10-106.3(3).
18. See id. § 24-10-106.3(3)-(4), (9).
19. See id. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(1)-(IV).
20. COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-106 (2016).
21. Anne Whalen Gill, Interpreting the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. LAW.,
Feb. 1997, at 77, 80 n.6.
22. Id. at 77.
23. Id. These exceptions were adopted in title 24, section 10-106(1) of the Colorado Revised
Statutes. Id.
24. Id. at 77-78.
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trict (a public entity) for a tort claim arising from a dangerous activity
(such as a violent student) because this would not fall under one of the
six exceptions in the statute.25 The School Safety Act amended the Colo-
rado Governmental Immunity Act by providing a new statutory excep-
tion for dangerous activities that occur in schools that is not limited to
physical conditions.26
B. Mass Shooting Data
It is important to understand the history of mass shootings in the
United States and the frequency of school shootings in order to provide
context to the intention and the purpose of the School Safety Act. In
2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted a study of active
shooter incidents that occurred from 2000 to 2013 .27 Of the 160 active
shooter incidents, thirty-nine (24.4%) occurred at an educational institu-
tion: a pre-K to twelfth-grade school, a place of higher education, or a
school related facility. 28 The second highest rate of shootings when bro-
ken up by location occurred at education institutes.2 9 In the thirty-nine
shootings that took place at education institutes, 117 people were killed
and 120 were wounded.3 0 The two highest death counts from the 160
active shooter incidents, which include incidents at education institutes
and other locations, occurred at Virginia Tech University (thirty-two
killed, seventeen wounded) and Sandy Hook Elementary School (twenty-
six killed, two wounded). Overall, the active shooter study found 1,043
people were killed or wounded in all of the active shooter incidents.32
Everytown for Gun Safety, a national coalition dedicated to ending
gun violence, also reported on FBI research of mass shootings from Jan-
uary 2009 to July 2015.33 Its research concluded that, during this seven
year period, there were 133 mass shootings across thirty-nine states.3 4
With less than one percent of gun homicides in 2012 occurring in inci-
dents with four or more victims, only a small portion of gun violence
overall involves mass shootings.3 5 In addition, there was evidence in only
25. See id.
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-106.3(4) (2016).
27. BLAIR & SCHWEIT, supra note 4, at 4-5. The study was conducted after President Obama
signed The Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 into law, which aids the attorney
general in investigating acts of public violence, including mass shootings. Id. at 4. The study sought
to "provide further clarity" to the threats that result in incidents of public violence. Id.
28. Id at 13.
29. Id. Shootings occurred at places of commerce at the highest rate, where seventy-three out
of the 160 (45.6%) shootings occurred. Id.
30. Id. at 15.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 7.
33. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND, ANALYSIS OF RECENT MASS SHOOTINGS
1 (2015), http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/09/analysis-mass-shootings.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2.
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one of the 133 shootings of a serious mental health issue that would have
prohibited the shooter from owning a gun.36
While this data and the number of mass shootings in the United
States seems daunting, a school shooting in the larger context of gun
deaths is a small and rare occurrence.37 In fact, even after the Sandy
Hook school shooting, Arne Duncan, the United States Secretary of Edu-
cation at the time, wrote in response to the incident, "[s]chools are
among the safest places for children and adolescents in our country, and,
in fact, crime in schools has been trending downward for more than a
decade."38 The National Center for Education Statistics' most recent re-
port, Indicators of School Crime and Safety, shows that out of the overall
amount of youth homicides, less than two percent occurred in schools.39
According to the Center's most recent data, in the 2011-2012 school
year there were 1,199 youth homicides, but only fifteen of those occurred
in schools.4 0 This suggests that youth are much more likely to be killed
outside of school than within school.4 1
C. The History and Foundation of Threat Assessments
The School Safety Act will create an assessment framework for
schools to use to identify threatening students to intervene before stu-
dents commit violent acts.42 It is useful to understand the structure and
history of a school threat assessment to better understand how schools
will use them.
The most recent report by the United States Secret Service (the Se-
cret Service) and the United States Department of Education (the De-
partment of Education) studied forty-one school shooters between 1974
and 2000.43 This report, known as the Safe Schools Report, found that
students who commit a school shooting possess a wide range of charac-
teristics and that "[t]here is no accurate or useful 'profile' of students
who engaged in targeted school violence."" Students involved in school
36. Id. at 5.
37. Todd A. Demitchell, Locked Down and Armed: Security Responses to Violence in Our
Schools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 275, 278 (2014).
38. Arne Duncan, Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis,
HOMEROOM: OFFICIAL BLOG U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Dec. 17, 2012),
http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012/12/resources-for-schools-to-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/.
39. SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. &




42. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(1I1) (2016).
43. BRYAN VOSSEKUIL ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE FINAL
REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2004) [hereinafter SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT],
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf.
44. Id. at 19.
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shootings had a range of attributes: some had straight As, some were
"bullies," and some suffered from social issues.45
The Safe Schools Report is based on a study the Secret Service pre-
viously conducted called the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP).6
The ECSP focused on behaviors of people who assassinated, attacked, or
attempted to assassinate or attack public officials in the United States.47
The ECSP led to the Secret Service's more thorough and robust use of
threat assessments to identify individuals who might harm public offi-
cials.48 The success with these threat assessments led the Secret Service
to extend this idea to students in schools.4 9
Following the Safe Schools Report, the Secret Service and the De-
partment of Education created Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to
Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates,
based on the Safe Schools Report's findings.50 The guide states that
threat assessments hould not include assessment of characteristics but
should focus on the facts for each individual case.5' The guide also cau-
tions that threat assessments should not be a tool to survey the entire
student body, but instead should be a tool to identify additional infor-
mation about a student after the student has exhibited some form of con-
cerning behavior.52
Colorado developed the Colorado School Safety Resource Center's
Essentials of School Threat Assessment as a guide to implementing threat
assessments in Colorado schools (the Colorado School Safety Hand-
book). This handbook is based in part on the Threat Assessment in
Schools guide.54 Therefore, threat assessments used in Colorado will be
based on similar studies and recommendations as threat assessments cre-
ated by the Secret Service and the Department of Education.
45. Id. at 19-20.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id at 5-6.
50. ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THREAT
ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING
SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES, at iii (2004),
https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/threatassessmentguide.pdf.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 45.
53. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, ESSENTIALS OF SCHOOL
THREAT ASSESSMENT: PREVENTING TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE (2015),
http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/CSSRC%20Documents/CSSRC%20Essentials%2Oof%2TA
%202014.pdf.
54. Id. at 6 (citing FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 29) (discussing the "[s]ix principles" that
"form the foundation of the threat assessment process").
55. See id.
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D. The Second Amendment and Gun Culture
This Comment addresses gun legislation and gun control as alterna-
tives to the School Safety Act, but to do so effectively, it is important to
understand the constitutional protections related to guns in the United
States as well as the culture and perceptions surrounding these protec-
tions. The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 5 6
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Second Amend-
1 .~~57 Ti en
ment to include an individual right to own certain weapons. This means
that, unlike other countries that have dealt with gun violence by categori-
cally banning weapons and guns, solutions must look different in the
United States.
In addition to constitutional protections, there is a strong cultural
opposition to gun control in the United States.5 9 Recently, more people
are in favor of gun rights and more people believe owning guns is a safe
solution to gun violence.60 The Pew Research Center conducted studies
that indicate a broad increase in support for gun rights and a decrease in
support for gun control, including the belief that gun ownership makes
people's homes safer and that gun ownership protects people from
-61crime.
E. Other Countries' Solutions to Mass Shootings
Comparing the School Safety Act to other countries' solutions to
mass shootings helps to illustrate the ineffectiveness of the School Safety
Act and to lay the foundation for discussing more successful alternatives.
Other countries have successfully decreased mass shootings without laws
like the School Safety Act.6 2 Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Japan all have lower gun violence rates than the United States.6 3
Years ago, when thirty-two people were killed in a mass shooting in
Australia at Port Author after a string of mass shootings from 1979 to
56. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
57. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 (2008) (holding that the District of
Columbia's ban on handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment).
58. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II.
59. Andrew Kohut, Despite Lower Crime Rates, Support for Gun Rights Increases, PEW RES.
CTR. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/17/despite-lower-crime-rates-
support-for-gun-rights-increases/; Growing Public Support for Gun Rights, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 10,
2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/10/growing-public-support-for-gun-rights/.
60. Kohut, supra note 59; Growing Support for Gun Rights, supra note 59.
61. Kohut, supra note 59; Growing Support for Gun Rights, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., Mark B. Melter, The Kids Are Alright; It's the Grown-Ups Who Scare Me: A
Comparative Look at Mass Shootings in the United States and Australia, 16 GoNZ. J. INT'L L. 33,
44-45 (2012); see also Walter Hickey, How Australia and Other Developed Nations Have Put a
Stop to Gun Violence, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2013, 8:07 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/canada-australia-japan-britain-gun-control-2013-1.
63. Hickey, supra note 62.
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1996, the Australian government passed strict gun control reform.M The-
se reforms banned assault style weapons and magazines, initiated a coun-
trywide gun buyback program, and banned owning a gun without a legit-
imate reason for the weapon.6 5 Since that incident, Australia has not had
another mass shooting.6 6
In the United Kingdom, any person who owns a gun must first
complete the process to obtain a certificate, and there are bans on many
types of guns.67 In Canada, there are also bans on many types of guns,
and owners must complete a similar process to obtain a gun license.68 In
addition, license agents are required to notify the gun purchaser's spouse
or next of kin that the person is purchasing a gun." In Japan, only hunt-
ing rifles and shotguns are legal, and an owner must first pass a class
with a written and practical exam and complete a mental health analy-
sis.70 While not all of these restrictions would be possible in the United
States because of constitutional protections, these xamples demonstrate
that passing gun restriction legislation has an effect on preventing mass
*71shootings.
III. ANALYSIS
Part III will explain the faults of the School Safety Act and recom-
mend alternatives to keep students safe in schools that avoid these faults.
First, this Part will discuss why the School Safety Act will be ineffective,
focusing on the problems with using threat assessments to identify and
prevent threats and on the lack of support the law has within the larger
field of gun regulation legislation. Next, this Part will explain the most
detrimental effects the School Safety Act will have-harming students
through overly broad assessments, perpetuating racial bias, and strength-
ening the connection between the school system and the juvenile and
criminal justice systems. Finally, this Part will discuss alternatives to the
School Safety Act, including passing gun regulation legislation and
strengthening school climate within schools, both of which can help cre-
ate a safe environment for students without producing the negative ef-
fects of the School Safety Act.
A. The School Safety Act Will Be Ineffective at Preventing School Shoot-
ings
The School Safety Act will be ineffective because threat assess-
ments will be unsuccessful at identifying threatening students and be-
64. Melter, supra note 62, at 44-45.
65. Id. at 45, 49.
66. Id. at 45.




71. See Melter, supra note 62, at 44-46; see also Hickey, supra note 62.
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cause the School Safety Act is unsupported by laws outside school walls
to address mass shootings. Threat assessments are ineffective because it
is difficult to identify students who pose a threat based on characteristics
or behaviors, yet the nature of using threat assessments requires schools
to do so.72 In addition, a comparison of the School Safety Act to other
countries' solutions to mass shootings suggests that larger efforts, such
as restriction and regulation of guns, are necessary to have a substantial
effect on preventing mass shootings.73
1. Threat Assessments Will Be Ineffective Because They Do Not
Successfully Identify Students Who Pose a Potential Threat
The Threat Assessment in Schools guide recommends that threat as-
sessments focus on individual facts and not be used as a tool to survey
the entire student body.74 This section will first explain why it is difficult
to identify students who pose a potential threat by focusing on character-
istics and behaviors. Next, it will explain why, despite the Threat As-
sessment in Schools guide's recommendations, threat assessments are
unlikely to focus on the facts of each individual case and are unlikely to
be used on individual students rather than the entire student body.
Many studies find that it is difficult to identify the specific charac-
teristics and behaviors of school shooters before they commit the act.7 5
While the general public might have a preconceived notion of who a
school shooter is based on past incidents or bias (for example, an antiso-
cial student with poor grades and few friends), the Safe Schools Report
mentioned above illustrates this bias is not correct.76 In fact, most of the
shooters surveyed in the Safe Schools Report were performing well in
school, and many were receiving grades of As and Bs at the time of the
attack.7 Some students in this group were enrolled in advanced courses
or were on the honor roll. 78 At the same time, some of the shooters stud-
ied were receiving grades of Cs, and Ds, or were failing school. While
student shooters fall into these categories, students who do not pose any
threat also fall into all of these categories, lessening the effectiveness of
grades (or any one characteristic or behavior) in identifying threatening
students.8 0 In fact, for any conduct that seems to define a school shoot-
72. See discussion infra Section III.A.I.
73. See discussion infra Section III.A.2.
74. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32, 45; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
75. See SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 19; see also Malcolm Gladwell, Thresholds
of Violence. How School Shootings Catch On, NEW YORKER, Oct. 19, 2015, at 30, 32-33,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/19/thresholds-of-violence; N. R. Kleinfield et al.,
Mass Murderers Fit Profile, as Do Many Others Who Don't Kill, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/us/mass-murderers-fit-profile-as-do-many-others-who-dont-
kill.html.
76. See SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 19-20.
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Kleinfield et al., supra note 75.
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er's behavior or personality, there are people who are not and will never
be a dangerous threat but who will fall into the same categories.8
For example, in response to the school shooting at Umpqua Com-
munity College in Roseburg, Oregon, the New York Times published an
article comparing various school shooters.82 The analysis led the authors
to remark that "[w]hat seems telling about the killers, however, is not
how much they have in common but how much they look and seem like
so many others who do not inflict harm."83 While many of the shooters
shared behaviors such as depression, loneliness, and general isolation
from others, the article also notes these behaviors depict tens of thou-
sands of Americans." Criminologist James Alan Fox from Northwestern
University, who has studied mass murderers, summarized this point say-
ing, "[w]e can't round up all the people who scare us."85
In Thresholds of Violence: How School Shootings Catch On, an ar-
ticle published by the New Yorker, Malcolm Gladwell further elaborated
on the idea that it is difficult to define and identify the characteristics or
behaviors of a school shooter.8 6 Gladwell applied the "Granovetterian
model" to the phenomenon of school shooters to illustrate how those
who commit the acts now no longer possess the same attributes thought
to be associated with a psychopathic killer as the shooters before and up
to the Columbine incident.87 To illustrate this point, Gladwell profiled
John LaDue, a young man who planned to shoot up and bomb his own
high school.88 LaDue, unlike many of the shooters before and up to Col-
umbine, did not have a history of suspicious behavior, problems in
school, a traumatic background, or mental health issues.89 When given
the standard psychological evaluation for a school shooter, LaDue did
not demonstrate any sign of a threat." Yet, LaDue had purchased guns
and materials to create dangerous bombs and had created detailed plans
specifying how he would carry out his attack.91 The fact that LaDue did






86. Gladwell, supra note 75, at 32-33.
87. Id. at 34-38. The Granovetterian model is the idea that when people join riots (or in the
case of school shootings, revolutions, or phenomenon, as Gladwell explains them), the further re-
moved the person is from the beginning of the incident, the less likely he or she will individually
possess the same characteristics or motivations for joining. Id. at 34-35. Instead, the person's joining
is a reaction to the people who joined before. Id. at 35.
88. Id. at 36-38.
89. Id. at 33, 36.
90. Id. at 36-37.
91. Id at 30, 32.
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evaluation further illustrates that the assumption that threat assessments
can accurately identify people who pose a threat is misguided.92
The Threat Assessment in Schools guide's recommendations to
avoid focusing on characteristics and to avoid surveying the entire stu-
dent body likely stem from the above difficulties in using those tactics to
identify threats. While the recommendations seem great on paper, it is
difficult to understand how they would actually work in practice.
First, it is difficult to analyze facts without conflating them with
characteristics. For example, the Threat Assessment in Schools guide
explains that to focus on facts of an individual case, the analysis should
be based on behaviors.93 However, behaviors are very similar to charac-
teristics because both can relate to how a person acts.94 In addition, a
focus on behavior over characteristics will not necessarily make identify-
ing a suspect any easier because school shooters do not always exhibit
the same behaviors,9 5 and because people who do not pose a threat may
exhibit the same behaviors as a school shooter.96 Second, while threat
assessments hould not be a tool to survey the entire student body, the
Threat Assessment in Schools guide states, "Any student with the motive,
intent, and ability potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at
school."9 7 Starting with the assumption that anyone is capable seems to
steer away from the recommendation that threat assessments not be used
to survey all students.98
Colorado's approach to threat assessments does not resolve these
concerns. The Colorado School Safety Handbook states, "An inquiry
should be initiated immediately in any situation of concern."99 The pre-
sumption to begin an inquiry at any hint of threat suggests that threat
assessments are likely to be used overzealously, which will result in
threat assessments used to survey the entire student body because offi-
cials will constantly be on the lookout for threats.1m In addition, the
handbook includes questions to identify students who are potential
threats, such as questions about their behaviors in class, their interactions
with peers, and whether they feel comfortable speaking with adults. The-
se questions suggest that threat assessments are still likely to be used by
92. See id. at 33, 36-37.
93. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32.
94. The definition of "behavior" according to the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary is, "[T]he
manner of conducting oneself." Behavior, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/behavior (last visited Feb. 12, 2016). The definition of "characteristic"
according to the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary is, "[A] distinguishing trait, quality, or property."
Characteristic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/characteristic
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
95. See Gladwell, supra note 75, at 32-33.
96. See Kleinfield et al., supra note 75.
97. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32.
98. See id.
99. COLo. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 6.
100. See id.
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focusing on characteristics and behaviors of students.'0 Therefore, the
recommendations to focus on individual facts instead of the entire stu-
dent body do not resolve the problems with threat assessments, and at-
tempting to avoid these outcomes while still using threat assessments i
not likely to be successful.10 2
In addition, the Threat Assessment in Schools guide is also prob-
lematic because the Safe Schools Report it stems from is based on a
study the Secret Service previously conducted called the Exceptional
Case Study Project, which focused on behaviors of adults who attacked
or attempted to attack United States public officials.0 3 A guide based on
a study for adults used for students is problematic because there is ex-
tended research that youths' psychological development differs greatly
from adults'.' 04
For example, young people "are more susceptible to influence, less
future oriented, less risk averse, and less able to manage their impulses
and behavior."'os In addition, the area of the brain that controls rational
and risk-averse decision-making is not fully developed until the early
twenties. o0 From this, one can infer not only that youth cannot be as-
sessed in the same way and will not respond in the same way to an as-
sessment as adults, but that the reasoning behind an attack is likely dif-
ferent for an adolescent than for an adult.'07 Because the brain develop-
ment, psychology, and decision-making of the two greatly differ, the
connection between adult attackers and students is too tenuous to con-
clude that a threat assessment designed for students will work in the
same way as a threat assessment designed for adult terrorists.0 8
101. See id. at 10, 12.
102. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32, 45; see also COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra
note 53, at 10, 12 (illustrating the shortfalls described above).
103. SAFE SCHOOLS REPORT, supra note 43, at 4; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
104. See, e.g., BRITTANY KINTIGH, MICH. COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, ADOLESCENT
DEVELOPMENT: JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT THAN ADULTS 1 (2012), http://www.miccd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Youth-Dev-Issue-Brief.pdf; NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE TEEN BRAIN: STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION (2011),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-teen-brain-still-under-construction/teen-
brain 141903.pdf; Teen Brain: Behavior, Problem Solving, and Decision Making, AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Dec. 2011),
https://www.aacap.org/AACAP/FamiliesandYouth/Facts forFamilies/FFF-Guide/The-Teen-
Brain-Behavior-Problem-Solving-and-Decision-Making-095.aspx.
105. KINTIGH, supra note 104, at 2 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less
Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1013 (2003)).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 2-6.
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2. The School Safety Act Will Be Ineffective Because it is Unsup-
ported by Other Laws That Have a Greater Effect on School
Shootings and Gun Violence, as Demonstrated by a Comparison
to Other Countries Whose Laws Have Been Effective in Prevent-
ing These Incidents
In addition to the difficulties of threat assessments, the School Safe-
ty Act will be ineffective because the law lacks support in the larger field
of gun regulation legislation. A comparison to laws in other countries
that have lower incidents of mass shootings demonstrates why a law like
the School Safety Act will be ineffective at preventing mass shootings
without support from gun regulation legislation.
Laws like the School Safety Act as a response to mass shootings are
unique to the United States.109 Other countries addressing mass shootings
focus on gun regulation and reducing the number of guns rather than on
identifying students who might be threatening. 0 The common justifica-
tion for these types of solutions to gun violence, as opposed to legislation
at a larger level, is that gun violence and products of it, such as school
shootings, are largely a mental health issue rather than a gun regulation
issue." The School Safety Act corroborates this idea by placing the re-
sponsibility on schools to prevent violence by focusing on characteristics
and behaviors of students through threat assessments.' This presuppos-
es that mitigating the problem through other means is too difficult or will
be ineffective. Other countries, however, have proved that is incorrect."3
For example, while the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Aus-
tralia all have lower gun violence rates than the United States, none of
these countries focus their efforts on threat assessments in schools to
prevent mass hootings.'14 Instead, these countries have stricter gun regu-
lation laws and lower numbers of guns per person."5 Each country bans
certain weapons and requires a certification or application process before
obtaining a gun.116 The fact that there are lower instances of mass shoot-
ings and lower gun deaths per year indicates that, in those countries, reg-
ulation of the weapon leads to lower instances of gun violence."7 Look-
109. See Sarah Boseley, High Gun Ownership Makes Countries Less Safe, US Study Finds,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2013, 9:06 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/18/gun-
ownership-gun-deaths-study; see also Hickey, supra note 62 (discussing laws from other countries
which do not include anything similar to the School Safety Act).
110. See Boseley, supra note 109; see also Hickey, supra note 62.
111. Hickey, supra note 62 (alluding to the common justification by stating other countries
have similar mental health problems but do not have the same rates of gun violence).
112. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-15-101(1)(a)(I)-(lV) (2016).
113. See Hickey, supra note 62; see also discussion supra Section II.E.
114. See Hickey, supra note 62 (explaining the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Austral-
ia's gun restriction laws, none of which include threat assessments in schools as a solution to mass
violence or public shootings).
115. Id.
116. Id.; see also discussion supra Section II.E.
117. See Hickey, supra note 62.
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ing at Australia as an example is most interesting because Australia suf-
fered from a series of mass shootings and public violence similar to the
United States and was able to prevent similar incidents from happening
in the future once it passed stricter gun regulation laws."8
While there may be other reasons why gun violence rates in the
United States differ from other countries, the United States cannot simp-
ly point to its citizens' mental health issues when there is a clear differ-
ence between gun laws in the United States and in countries with lower
rates of gun violence." 19 In How Australia and Other Developed Nations
Have Put a Stop to Gun Violence, Walter Hickey pointedly states, "Other
countries all over the world play the same video games and have the
same mental health problems as the United States, but manage to avoid a
sky-high gun murder rate and frequent public shooting massacres," sug-
gesting the laws that regulate guns and gun ownership in other countries
play a larger role in reducing gun violence than focusing on mental
health.2 0
Despite the documented success other countries have found through
gun regulation, Colorado has failed to pass similar legislation that would
have a positive effect on preventing mass shootings. 121 This calls into
question whether the School Safety Act can be successful at preventing
gun violence and mass shootings in schools when other countries' suc-
cess relates to legislation the United States and Colorado do not have.122
For example, the National Rifle Association's state profile illus-
trates that citizens of Colorado do not need a permit to purchase most
guns and do not need to register most guns.123 This is in contrast with the
laws from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, which all
require some sort of certificate, application, or protocol before obtaining
a gun.124 This lack of restrictions impinges on Colorado's ability to re-
duce mass shootings, even with laws like the School Safety Act, as
demonstrated by the research that shows stricter gun regulations correlate
with lower gun violence, while looser gun regulations correlate with
higher gun violence.125 Meaningful gun legislation has failed to pass at
the federal level as well.12 6 For example, Congress introduced the Fix
118. See Melter, supra note 62, at 44-45; see also discussion supra Section II.E.
119. Hickey, supra note 62.
120. Id.
121. See Colorado State Profile, NAT'L RIFLE Ass'N AM., INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Nov. 7,
2014), https://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-gun-laws/colorado/.
122. Compare Hickey, supra note 62 (explaining restrictions on gun ownership in the United
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Australia), with Colorado State Profile, supra note 121 (explaining
restrictions on gun ownership in Colorado).
123. Colorado State Profile, supra note 12 1.
124. See Hickey, supra note 62.
125. See id.
126. See Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013); see also Text of the Fix
Gun Checks Act of 2013, GovTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/llI 3/s374/text#
(last updated Mar. 12, 2013).
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Gun Checks Act in 2013, which was designed to strengthen background
checks, but it died in committee without even reaching a vote.127
Comparing the United States' efforts to reduce gun violence and
school shootings with other countries' efforts that have been successful
in lowering gun deaths per year illustrates why the problem cannot be
fully addressed without regulating the weapon itself. The failure to pass
legislation that would likely have a more targeted effect on reducing
school shootings suggests that the School Safety Act is an outlier that
will struggle to be effective without support from other legislation work-
ing collectively to accomplish the goal of reducing school shootings.
B. The School Safety Act Will Be Harmful to Students
Not only will the School Safety Act be ineffective, but it will actual-
ly be harmful to many students by (1) targeting students who are not a
threat to their schools or communities through overly broad assessments;
(2) perpetuating the racial bias in schools; and (3) strengthening the al-
ready dangerous pipeline between schools and the juvenile and criminal
justice systems.
1. Threat Assessments Will Target Students Who Are Not Actually
a Threat Through Overly Broad Assessments
The Threat Assessment in Schools guide explains that threat as-
sessments should be based on facts and should not be used to survey all
students.128 However, as noted above, actually performing threat assess-
ments in such a way will be unsuccessful.12 9 Therefore, because threat
assessments are still likely to be used on the entire student body and like-
ly to focus on characteristics and behaviors, threat assessments will be
particularly harmful to those students who may possess behaviors that
could be perceived as "threatening" but are not in fact threats, such as
students suffering from mental illness and students with disabilities.
The Colorado School Safety Handbook suggests the following
questions to identify what threat a student poses: "Is the student experi-
encing hopelessness, desperation or despair?"; "Does the student have a
trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?"; "Has the stu-
dent come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what? (Email,
texting, website, posters, papers, class assignments, rule-breaking, vio-
lence, harassment, adjustment problems, depression r despair, acting-
out behavior, etc.)"; and "Has the student experienced serious difficulties
or been in distress?"130 These questions are overly broad and could in-
clude nonthreatening students, uch as students with mental illness.
127. See S. 374.
128. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 32, 45; see also discussion supra Section II.C.
129. See discussion supra Section IlIl.A. 1.
130. COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12.
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For example, on September 22, 2015, students from local high
schools in Colorado came to speak to the School Safety and Youth Men-
tal Health Legislative Committee about youth mental health.131 All six of
the students present shared that they had either felt depression or some
other form of mental illness or knew friends who had.132 These students
described attributes of high school students struggling with mental health
issues, which included feeling depressed, antisocial, and unable to con-
fide in a trusted adult about their problems.3 3
In addition to these students' own personal stories, statistics on de-
pression suggest between ten and fifteen percent of teens suffer from
depression at any one time.' 34 In 2011, "a nationwide survey of college
students . . . found that . .. [thirty] percent of students reported feel-
ing . . . depressed at some time."' 35 This demonstrates that a mental
health issue such as depression is common among young people.3 6
However, because of the limited number of students who actually com-
mit an act of school violence, it also demonstrates that the majority of
students suffering from a mental health issue are not a threat.',3  Yet,
many of the behaviors of students suffering from mental illness-such as
feelings of depression and hopelessness, inability to confide in an adult,
experiencing serious difficulties, or acting out in class-could be used to
identify potential threats.3 8
Students with disabilities are another group of students that could
possess some of the behaviors on a threat assessment without actually
being a threat. Concerning questions from the Colorado School Safety
Handbook that relate to these behaviors include the following: "Has the
student come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what?
(Email, texting, website, posters, papers, class assignments, rule-
breaking, violence, harassment, adjustment problems, depression or des-
pair, acting-out behavior, etc.)"; "Has the student been a victim and/or
initiator of hostile, harassing or bullying behavior directed toward other
students, teachers, or other staff?"; "Does the student see violence as an
131. 1 attended this meeting on Sept. 22, 2015, at the Colorado State Capitol in room 271, from
9:00 AM to 11:00 AM. This committee was created by the School Safety Act, and it was responsible
for studying issues related to youth mental health and school safety and developing assessments and
protocols to assess students and identify threats. School Safety and Youth in Crisis Interim Commit-
tee: Meeting on S.B. 15-214, 2015 Leg., 70th Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2015) (statements of Reps., Colo.
Youth Advisory Council & Colie's Closet).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Therese J. Borchard, Why Are So Many Teens Depressed?, PSYCHCENTRAL (Mar. 4,
2010), http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2010/03/04/why-are-so-many-teens-depressed/.
135. NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
DEPRESSION AND COLLEGE STUDENTS 2 (2012),
https://infocenter.nimh.nih.gov/pubstatic/NIH%2012-4266/NIH%2012-4266.pdf.
136. See id.
137. For information on the infrequency of school shootings, see discussion supra Section II.B.
138. COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12.
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acceptable or desirable way to solve problems?"; and "Is the student's
conversation and 'story' consistent with their actions?" 39
Students with disabilities can have a range of mental, physical, or
developmental disabilities, but many forms of educational disabilities
manifest behaviors associated with the threat assessment such as Atten-
tion Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, which might cause one to act out in
class,140 to Social Anxiety, which might make a student more prone to
violent outbreaks.141 Nationwide, there are an estimated 5.7 million stu-
dents who are considered special education students because of some sort
of disability.142 However, again, the infrequency of violent school inci-
dents such as school shootings suggests there are many students with
disabilities who might exhibit potentially threatening behavior according
to the Colorado School Safety Handbook who are not actually a threat.14 3
2. Threat Assessments Will Exacerbate the Racial Bias Already
Present in Schools
Racial bias has historically existed in Colorado schools. 4 One ex-
ample that demonstrates racial bias in schools is discipline assessments
and protocols, which have a disproportionately negative impact on stu-
dents of color.145 Looking at discipline assessments in schools illustrates
the inherent racial bias that still exists, which should caution schools,
administrators, and lawmakers against using other assessments that could
have a disproportionate effect on students of color, such as threat as-
sessments.146
A study done by Padres & J6venes Unidos (Padres), a leading or-
ganization on school discipline issues, found that, in the 2003-2004
school year, "black students . . . were over five times more likely to be
expelled, and over twice as likely to be referred to law enforcement"
when compared to white students, and "Latino students were .. . almost
three times as likely to be expelled and referred to law enforcement
139. Id.
140. See Caroline Miller, What's ADHD (and What's Not) in the Classroom, CHILD MIND
INST. (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.childmind.org/en/posts/articles/2015-3-10-adhd-classroom-guide-
teachers-parents.
141. See Caroline Miller, How Anxiety Leads to Disruptive Behavior, CHILD MIND INST. (Mar.
26, 2013), http://www.childmind.org/en/posts/articles/2013-3-26-anxiety-and-disruptive-behavior.
142. CANDACE CORTIELLA & SHELDON H. HOROWITZ, THE STATE OF LEARNING
DISABILITIES: FACTS, TRENDS, AND EMERGING ISSUES 12 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.ncld.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/2014-State-of-LD.pdf.
143. For discussion on infrequency of school shootings, see discussion supra Section II.B.
144. See PADRES & J6VENES UNIDOS & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, LESSONS IN RACIAL
JUSTICE AND MOVEMENT BUILDING: DISMANTLING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE IN








[when] compared to [w]hite students.",4 7 Padres explains that one of the
reasons for these disproportionate results is the conscious and uncon-
scious idea that students of color are "[m]ore threatening and prone to
violence" and "[1]acking self-discipline." 48
Padres's study, which is aligned with numerous other studies, illus-
trates how racial bias in school discipline goes beyond how schools treat
students of color but is a part of "a powerful manifestation of an entire
system of oppressive and regressive cultural, political, and social forc-
es."1 49 This means racial bias in schools stems from various other racially
biased policies throughout history such as the "Tough on Crime" era, the
elimination and stigma of social welfare programs, the animosity toward
immigrants, and more.15 0 Because racial bias is a systemic problem, it is
more deeply ingrained in society and, therefore, will be more difficult to
eradicate and will require more than just an understanding that it oc-
curs.'5' Inherent, systemic racial bias is problematic for implementing
threat assessments because threat assessments focus on whether students
exhibit behaviors associated with bullying, violence, or acting out in
class.152 Bias toward which students exhibit those behaviors could result
in a disproportionate number of students identified as threats, just as bias
results in a disproportionate number of students identified with discipline
issues. 1
In response to efforts to address racial bias in school discipline,
Colorado's use of out of school suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to
law enforcement are dropping in percentages, yet are still dropping faster
for white students than students of color.154 Though racial bias has de-
creased within school discipline, bringing in a threat assessment will
exacerbate racial bias in schools because it will target behaviors that are
commonly thought to be associated with students of color, such as vio-
lence and lack of discipline. 15 We need not look further to find evidence
of this than the story of Ahmed Mohamed, mentioned at the beginning of
147. Id.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id. at 10; see also Anne Gregory, Russell J. Skiba & Pedro A. Noguera, The Achievement
Gap and the Discipline Gap. Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 59, 62-63
(2010) (discussing that minority students were more likely to be "differentially selected for disci-
pline consequences"); THOMAS RUDD, KIRWAN INST. FOR THE STUDY OF RACE & ETHNICITY, THE
OHIO STATE UNIV., RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 2-3 (2014),
http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/racial-disproportionality-schools-02.pdf
(discussing that teachers are implicitly biased towards African Americans in the classroom and this
results in "racial disproportionality in school discipline").
150. LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 9-10.
151. See id.
152. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12.
153. See LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 6.
154. PADRES & JOVENES UNIDOS, COLORADO SCHOOL DISCIPLINE REPORT CARD 5-6 (2015),
http://www.padresunidos.org/files/media-root/ES2JT/PJU-
01_Report2015 web%20v2%204_6_15.pdf.
155. Id. at 6; see also COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 10, 12 (instructing
teachers to evaluate the behavior of students).
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this Comment.'56 After Mohamed's incident, sources suggested that
school officials were likely motivated by racial bias in their treatment
and inquiry of Mohamed's behavior.15 7
3. Threat Assessments Will Exacerbate the School-to-Prison Pipe-
line by Strengthening the Connection Between Schools and the
Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems
The School Safety Act will exacerbate the school-to-prison pipeline,
a phenomenon that involves overzealous disciplinary practices, including
out-of-school suspensions, expulsions, tickets, and arrests.'5 8 This is be-
cause the School Safety Act will inevitably involve more law enforce-
ment in students' lives and more strongly connect schools to the juvenile
and criminal justice systems.159
The school-to-prison pipeline happens when schools use discipline
tactics such as suspensions, expulsions, tickets, and arrests, all of which
lead students out of schools, into the streets, and into the juvenile and
criminal justice systems.1so This is a pipeline effect because high num-
bers of out of school suspensions and expulsions correlate with high
numbers of student referrals to law enforcement.161 In addition, students
who have been suspended or expelled are more likely to drop out and
never graduate from high school.162 Students who drop out or never
graduate from high school are more likely to end up in the juvenile jus-
tice system, and many students who drop out or never graduate from
high school end up in the adult criminal justice system.1 63 In addition,
because students of color are more likely to receive harsher punishment
in school, including tickets, suspensions, and expulsions, the school-to-
prison pipeline disproportionately affects students of color.'6
156. See James Edwards, Ahmed Mohamed and the Lingering Effects of Racial Profiling, PRI
(Sept. 18, 2015, 9:30 AM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-18/ahmed-mohamed-and-lingering-
effects-racial-profiling; see also Dexter Thomas, #IStandWithAhmed Lesson: Curiosity Is for White
Kids, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015, 8:01 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/community/la-
ahmed-mohamed-racism-20150916-htmlstory.html.
157. See Edwards, supra note 156; see also Thomas, supra note 156.
158. See LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 6-7.
159. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 6 (urging school officials to contact
police force at any time); see also ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., POLICE IN SCHOOLS ARE NOT
THE ANSWER TO THE NEWTOWN SHOOTING 5 (2013),
http://www.advancementproject.org/resources/entry/police-in-schools-are-not-the-answer-to-the-
newtown-shooting (explaining how police are overzealous with their practices in schools).
160. LESSONS IN RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 6-7.
161. Id. at 6 (reflecting the amount of out of school suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to
law enforcement through chart).
162. See Robert Balfanz et al., Sent Home and Put Off-Track: The Antecedents, Disproportion-
alities, and Consequences of Being Suspended in the Ninth Grade, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD. 1, I
(2014).
163. TASK FORCE TO STUDY HIGH SCH. DROPOUT RATES OF PERSS. IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, SCHOOL DROPOUTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 1 (2012), http://dlslibrary.state.md.us/publications/Exec/GOCCP/SB755Ch286_2011.pdf.




This phenomenon is likely to be exacerbated with the use of threat
assessments because th y include communication and close relationships
between schools and law enforcement.165 For example, the Colorado
School Safety Handbook states, "If at any time information suggests the
need for law enforcement assistance, that assistance should be requested
immediately."'66 In addition to the handbook, which encourages law en-
forcement involvement, law enforcement is also likely to be overzealous-
ly used in threat assessments because historically, law enforcement is
involved in Colorado schools even when students have not actually
committed a serious offense.1 6 7 For example, "between 2007 and 2012,
the majority of referrals to law enforcement [in Denver] were for detri-
mental behavior, drug violations, 'other' violations of Code of Conduct,
and disobedience/defiance - not for serious weapons or other school
safety concerns."l68
While there may be incidents where law enforcement presence is
necessary, as the study above demonstrates, many times law enforcement
is notified when they do not need to be, which means students are receiv-
ing tickets and being arrested when they do not need to be.16 9 Therefore,
there is a large risk that the School Safety Act, which will require more
communication between schools and law enforcement, will result in a
strengthening of the school-to-prison pipeline because school officials
are encouraged to notify law enforcement at any time, and law enforce-
ment is already notified too frequently for frivolous, subjective, and su-
perficial situations.170 While the connection between a threat assessment
and youth incarceration might at first seem tenuous, research demon-
strates there is a long-standing correlation between overzealous disci-
pline polices and youth incarceration, and this connection has serious
repercussions for youth and communities.' 71
165. See COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES. CTR., supra note 53, at 6.
166. Id.
167. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 159, at 5.
168. Id.
169. See id
170. See id.; see also COLO. SCH. SAFETY RES, CTR., supra note 53, at 6.
171. See BARRY HOLMAN & JASON ZIEDENBERG, JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE DANGERS OF
DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE
FACILITIES 4-9, 12-14 (2006), http://wwwjusticepolicy.org/images/upload/06-
I _repdangersofdetention jj.pdf. In addition to students ending up in the school-to-prison pipeline,
actual time in detention as a juvenile is problematic on its own because of the dangerous effects of
juvenile detention. Id. For example, detention can actually increase recidivism for a juvenile rather
than reduce it. Id. at 4-6. In fact, detention is the highest predictor of recidivism, greater than being a
gang member, carrying a weapon, or having a poor relationship with one's parents. Id. In addition,
research finds that at least one third of detention centers are overcrowded, which has a negative
impact particularly on youth with mental illness, and detaining youth does not actually reduce crime
in the community as it is meant to. Id. at 8. Juvenile detention also has a negative impact on the
youth's ability to return to school and to gain employment. Id. at 9-10.
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C. Alternatives to the School Safety Act
It is possible to have safe schools without increased use of threat as-
sessments and law enforcement involvement. While the motivation to
implement legislation that attempts to reduce school violence is under-
standable, for all of the reasons stated above, the School Safety Act will
be ineffective and is likely to do more harm than good. In light of this,
the following are some recommendations for alternatives: (1) addressing
the root of the problem by passing gun regulation legislation that focuses
on restricting access to guns, and (2) implementing research and evi-
dence-based practices to improve school climate.
1. Gun Regulation Legislation
It is unfair and unusual to ask and expect schools to take on the en-
tire responsibility of safety when the problem extends beyond school
walls.172 To make the greatest impact on preventing mass shootings,
whether in schools or out of schools, legislatures need to reform gun
regulation laws to make access to guns more difficult, which will in turn
reduce the number of guns in the United States.173 While the most effec-
tive way to do this might be to institute countrywide bans or to criminal-
ize the ownership of guns, the constitutional right to bear arms-and the
societal norms that follow from it-would prevent these restrictions.17 4
Therefore, the remainder of this Comment will focus on solutions that
would not unduly burden the Second Amendment. Part a will discuss a
universal background check procedure so all gun purchasers obtain a
background check, and Part b will discuss a more rigorous and thorough
background check procedure.'75 With these outside supports in place,
schools can more effectively focus on keeping their students safe know-
ing those outside school walls are also doing their part in this important
job.
a. Universal Background Checks
The National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICBC
System) is the federal background check system currently in place, creat-
ed by the Brady Act, and supported by many politicians, including Presi-
dent Obama. The NICBC System prohibits those with a felony or do-
172. See discussion supra Section Ill.A.2.
173. See discussion infra Section 11I.C. 1.
174. For a discussion on gun control and gun culture in the United States, see supra Section
II.D.
175. These restrictions have been suggested and considered by the President and by Congress,
suggesting they are not unduly burdensome to the Second Amendment. WHITE HOUSE, Now IS THE
TIME: THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING
GUN VIOLENCE 3 (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh-now is the-timefull.pdf; see, e.g., Fix
Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013).
176. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 175, at 3. The Brady Act was passed on November 30,
1993, and created a five-day waiting period before a person could officially purchase a gun in states
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mestic violence conviction from obtaining a gun, and it has prevented 1.5
million people from purchasing guns. However, there are many ways
to buy a gun without undergoing this background check.' 8
For example, many people purchase guns at a pawnshop or other re-
sell location where background checks generally do not occur, and many
private retail sellers are exempt from running a background check.'79 In
addition, only sellers who are "engaged in the business of selling guns"
are required to obtain a federal license, which in turn requires them to
administer background checks on their purchases.'8 0 However, many
sellers circumvent this requirement because they do not fall under the
strict definition of selling guns "regularly."'8 This allows shops that only
occasionally sell guns, or sell guns not as their primary purpose, to skirt
the federal license requirement, enabling them to sell guns without con-
ducting background checks.18 2 The first step in tightening regulations is
to ensure background checks do occur at these locations for all gun sales.
One way to do this is to broaden the definition of "engaged in business"
to ensure that even those who sell guns occasionally must obtain a feder-
al license and conduct background checks.'83 While buyers could still
avoid a background check when a gun is sold or transferred among fami-
ly members, close friends, or within another unregulated purchase, ensur-
ing that established sellers use background checks will tighten the securi-
ty around gun purchases.184
b. More Rigorous and Thorough Background Checks
While more strictly implementing a universal background check
would help tighten regulations in gun purchases, there are some prob-
lems with relying on the current background check procedures alone.
Requiring background checks under the current procedures will not pre-
vent all people who pose a threat from obtaining a gun.85 Many of the
shooters in recent mass shootings obtained their guns legally and passed
a federal background check, including the Umpqua Community College
that did not have an acceptable alternative background check system. Bradv Law, ATF,
https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/brady-law (last updated July 29, 2015). Therefore, this
measure incentivized states to create background check systems. Id.
177. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 175, at 3.
178. Id.; see also Larry Buchanan et al., How They Got Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/03/us/how-mass-shooters-got-their-guns.html (last
updated Dec. 3, 2015) ("The vast majority of guns used in 15 recent mass shootings ... were bought
legally and with a federal background check.").
179. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 175, at 3.
180. EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, BEYOND GRIDLOCK: How WHITE HOUSE ACTION ON
GUN VIOLENCE CAN SAVE LIVES 2, 4 (2015),
http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/1 0/beyond-gridlock-white-house-action-gun-violence-
can-save-lives.pdf.




185. See Buchanan et al., supra note 178.
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shooter in Oregon, the news station shooter in Virginia, the Sikh temple
shooter in Wisconsin, and the movie theater shooter in Colorado.186
At the time James Holmes, the man who attacked the audience at a
movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, in July of 2012, purchased four guns
at a store, he had already purchased rounds of ammunition for different
types of weapons on the Internet, and he was currently seeing a psychia-
trist for mental health issues.187 Yet he was able to purchase the addition-
al guns at a store without any problems.'88 Under the current background
check system, even a serious mental health issue would not have pre-
vented him from purchasing these materials.189
To prevent people who pose a threat from obtaining guns, back-
ground checks need to include more than simply running someone's
name through a list. They need to make sure the person is not purchasing
the gun for the purpose of an attack and make sure the person is able to
safely own a gun.190 This should be a longer, more intensive process to
ensure that past suspicious behavior, such as recent purchase of guns,
ammunition, or other weapons, is identified and assessed prior to pur-
chasing a gun.191 While mental health may also be a relevant factor, as
demonstrated above, it is difficult to identify a person who poses a threat
based solely on behaviors associated with mental health issues.192 The
fact that mass shooters in the past have been able to pass a background
check and purchase a gun even with mental health issues corroborates
this.193 It is possible, however, to identify the number and types of guns a
person already owns and the time that person purchased those guns.
While it may seem ironic to suggest stronger assessment for gun
purchasers while advocating against it for students, more strictly as-
sessing potential gun purchasers is different from conducting threat as-
sessments on students for many reasons. First, there is a greater risk of
danger for gun purchasers than for students at school because, as re-
search demonstrates, school shootings are a small and rare occurrence in
the context of larger gun violence.194 In addition, gun purchasers seek out
a gun, and in doing so, understand that some restrictions come with this
purchase. It is similar to the understanding that someone will assess us
186. Id In Oregon, a man killed six people at a college he attended. Id. In Virginia, a man shot
and killed a television reporter and a cameraman while they reported on live television. Id. In Wis-
consin, a man shot and killed six people at a Sikh temple during a Sunday service. Id. In Colorado, a





191. See id. (discussing specifically how James Holmes's past suspicious behavior of purchas-
ing guns and ammunition online did not prevent him from purchasing more in person).
192. See discussion supra Section III.A.I.
193. Buchanan et al., supra note 178.
194. See Demitchell, supra note 37, at 278-79; see also ROBERS ET AL., supra note 39, at 6.
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when we obtain a driver's license or a license to practice a particular
profession. There is an understood pattern of assessments when people
take on a responsibility, such as owning a gun or driving a car, that is not
present when a student attends school.
In addition, focusing on prior purchases of a gun owner can accu-
rately determine information that is relevant to an attack, unlike as-
sessing personality or even mental health.195 If a background check sys-
tem required the logging of all purchases, sellers would be able to tell
which guns people owned and when they purchased them. While this
would not in itself prevent people who pose a threat from obtaining guns,
it could make it more difficult if certain limits were imposed, such as a
maximum number of weapons a person could purchase at one time, a
time period between purchases, or a waiting period before each purchase.
We could also learn from other countries' efforts by implementing simi-
lar tactics, such as more rigorous application or certification processes.196
It is impossible to meaningfully consider these reforms without ad-
dressing the difficulties the gun lobby in the United States poses. The
National Rifle Association (NRA) contributed over twenty million dol-
lars to political campaigns from 1990 to 2016.197 It also spends a signifi-
cant amount of money on lobbying efforts.'9 8 These efforts help the gun
lobby defeat legislation by influencing politicians on the inside to vote
against bills or to keep bills from being introduced.'99 For example, the
use of paid lobbyists on the outside to further encourage politicians to
vote or act a certain way and the promise or withdrawal of campaign
money hanging over politicians' heads proved to be effective tools of
- 200
persuasion.
In addition, the NRA and the gun lobby as a whole are part of a
broader, cultural opposition to gun control. This opposition includes
more people who are in favor of gun rights and are opposed to gun re-
strictions and who believe owning guns keeps people and homes safer.2 01
These perceptions are relatively new,202 and with each horrific shooting
195. See Buchanan et al., supra note 178 (discussing the purchase of dangerous materials made
by someone with the intent to perform a mass attack); see also Gladwell, supra note 75, at 30, 32
(discussing the purchases of dangerous materials made by someone with the intent to perform a mass
attack).
196. See discussion supra Sections IIE., 11I.A.2.
197. National Rifle Assn: Total Contributions, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/totals.php?id=D000000082&cycle=2014 (last visited Feb. 13,
2016).
198. National Rifle Assn: Lobbying Summary, OPENSECRETS.ORG [hereinafter Lobbying],
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000082 (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
199. See id.; see also Why the Gun Lobby Is Winning, ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21647627-prevent-gun-deaths-politicians-offermore-
guns-why-gun-lobby-winning.
200. See Why the Gun Lobby is Winning, supra note 199.
201. Kohut, supra note 59; Growing Support for Gun Rights, supra note 59; see also discus-
sion supra Section II.D.
202. Kohut, supra note 59.
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unable to sway people's opinions, one must wonder if the political agen-
da has anything, or everything, to do with this. It is no surprise then that
gun reforms like the ones suggested above would have a difficult time
gaining momentum in Congress, let alone passing into law.203 Fully ad-
dressing how to dismantle the political capital of the gun lobby is worthy
of its own complete analysis that is beyond the scope of this Comment,
but it is at least necessary to acknowledge this difficult barrier.
2. Improving School Climate
Another way to keep students safe in schools without using threat
assessments is to improve school climate. School climate is the cumula-
tive perception among teachers, administrators, and students about "the
quality and character of school life." 204 A positive school climate exists
when schools support students, foster development, and students and
adults at school feel cared for and safe.205
Laws like the School Safety Act that call for threat assessments and
increased police presence in schools are not effective at keeping schools
and students safe, despite widely held misperceptions,206 and will actual-
ly work together to have a paramount negative ffect on school climate.
A better way to keep schools and students safe is to take substantial steps
207to improve school climate.20 In fact, even the Threat Assessment in
Schools guide included a section about improving school climate, calling
school climate the "foundation" of safe schools.208 This demonstrates that
even those advocating for threat assessments understand that they are not
always necessary, particularly when schools employ alternate practic-
es.209
Evidenced practices demonstrate that one of the best ways to im-
prove school climate is to focus on relationships.2 10 Relationships are
important because they help cultivate an environment of trust where stu-
203. In fact, in 2013, the 113th Congressional Session introduced the Fix Gun Checks Act of
2013, which proposed two very similar restrictions as the two mentioned above, but did not make it
to a vote after dying in committee. See Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013).
204. NAT'L SCH. CLIMATE COUNCIL, NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE STANDARDS:
BENCHMARKS TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVE TEACHING, LEARNING AND COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL
IMPROVEMENT 2, http://www.schoolclimate.org/climate/documents/school-climate-standards.pdf
(last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
205. Id.
206. See discussion supra Section III.A.
207. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 9, 11 (calling school cultural climate the foundation to
safe schools).
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at II ("The threat assessment process by itself is unlikely to have a lasting effect on
the problem of targeted school violence unless that process is implemented in the larger context of
strategies to ensure that schools offer their students safe and secure learning environments. The
principal objective of school violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates
ofsafety, respect, and emotional support within educational institutions.") (emphasis added).
210. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 159, at 14.
2016] 745
DENVERLAWREVIEW
dents feel comfortable discussing problems they face.2 11 Ways to culti-
vate relationships and improve school climate include implementing al-
ternative conflict resolution programs, connecting students with adults,
ensuring respect in those relationships, and encouraging safe and appro-
priate avenues for students to confide in adults about personal issues or
concerns for their peers.212
One popular form of conflict resolution that schools use effectively
is peer mediation, where students work together with a trained mediator
to resolve problems.213 This form of conflict resolution reduces tradition-
al punishments, such as suspension and expulsion.214 This is important
because harsh disciplinary practices actually interfere with a school's
ability to create a positive school climate.215
Making efforts to connect students and adults at school, and ensur-
ing that all students have a trusted adult they can confide in, also im-
proves school climate.216 These relationships help keep schools safe be-
cause adults are better able to focus on students' needs, including emo-
tional needs.217 In addition, strong relationships between students and
adults help foster a culture of respect and tolerance, and therefore bully-
ing, shaming, and harassment occur less often.2 18 These relationships also
enable students to reach out to trusted adults when a peer or they them-
selves are suffering or struggling.219 When students feel their voices are
heard and the adults in their school care about hem, problems that could
result in violence are properly addressed and mitigated before they be-
come more serious issues. In addition, this way does not involve the
problems associated with threat assessments mentioned above.220
CONCLUSION
Relying on ineffective threat assessments without gun regulation
legislation from outside school walls will not keep students safe. Not
only will the School Safety Act be ineffective at keeping students safe
but it will harm students-particularly special education students, stu-
dents with mental illness, and students of color-by subjecting them to
211. Id.
212. Id.; FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 11-13.
213. Linda Stamato & Sanford Jaffe, Conflict Resolution at School and on the Playground,
RUTGERS CTR. FOR NEGOT. & CONFLICT RESOL., http://cncr.rutgers.edulconflict-resolution-at-
school-on-the-playground/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
214. Id.
215. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 159, at 1-2, 15 (urging legislators and
administrators to not place more police in schools because of the negative effects it has); see also
ELORA MUKHERJEE, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY
SCHOOLS 27 (2007), http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/criminalizing theclassroom_report.pdf (discussing
the encroachment of police involvement in school activities).
216. FEIN ET AL., supra note 50, at 12.
217. Id. at 11-12.
218. Id. at 12.
219. Id. at 13.
220. Id.
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constant biased analysis and scrutiny. In addition, threat assessments
could push students out of school and into the juvenile and criminal jus-
tice systems. To keep students and schools safe, Colorado should instead
focus on passing gun regulation legislation to restrict access to guns out-
side school walls and building positive school climates.
Doing otherwise places the responsibility of safety substantially on
the schools and the students, who should not be solely responsible for
preventing school violence. If we are serious about keeping students and
communities safe, we need to abandon laws that would actually harm
students, and make more serious, evidenced based efforts to improve
school safety. Then, schools can focus on educating students, knowing
the laws in place will not harm them, and are instead effective, robust,
and smart laws that will protect them. The School Safety Act was created
with good intentions, but it is not enough, and it in fact will move us in
the opposite direction of where we need to be.
Haley DiRenzo
* Haley DiRenzo is a May 2017 J.D. Candidate at the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. She would like to thank Denver Law Professor Alexi Freeman for her wisdom and guidance
in helping to make this comment better and the Denver Law Review team for their hard work in
doing the same. Haley is especially grateful to all the mentors, colleagues, friends, and supporters
who instilled in her a passion for students' rights and juvenile justice, inspiring her to write on this
topic and to be a future advocate in this field.
2016] 747

